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THE

BHA'SHA' PARICHCHHEDA

AND ITS COMMENTARY

THE SIDDHA'NTA MUKTA'VALI,

AN EXPOSITION

OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY

BY

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VIS'WANA'THA PANCHA'NANA BHATTA,

WITH AN ENGLISH VERSION.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

In pursuance of the attempt, referred to in the preface to the English version of the *Laghu-Kaumudī*, the attempt viz., "to encourage and facilitate the interchange of ideas between the pandits and the senior English scholars of the Government Colleges," this version of the most popular text-book of the Nyáya has been commenced. In these north-west Provinces it is customary to read the simpler compendium, the *Tarka-Sangraha*, of which a version has been already given, before entering upon the *Bhásha-Parichchheda* with its commentary. In Bengal the student usually begins at once with this larger and more complete exposition of the Nyáya system; and every Bráhman student, with any pretensions to general scholarship, is expected to master Vis'wanátha's work at some time or other.

Benares College
5th January 1851. } J. R. B.

THE BHA'SHA'-PARICHCHHEDA

WITH ITS COMMENTARY THE SIDDHA'NTA-MUKTA'VALI.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I. THE CATEGORIES.

नमो गणेशाय ॥

Salutation to Ganes'a!

चूडामणीकृतविधुर्वलयीकृतवासुकिः । भवो भवतु भव्याय लीलाताण्डवपण्डितः ॥ निजनिर्मितकारिकावलीमतिसंक्षिप्तचिरन्तनोक्तिभिः । विशदीकरवाणि कौतुकान्नतु राजीवदयावशंवदः ॥ सद्व्या गुणगुम्फिता सुकृतिनां सत्कर्मणां ज्ञापिका सत्सामान्यविशेषनित्यमिलिताभावप्रकर्षाञ्चला । विष्णोर्वक्षसि विश्वनाथकृतिना सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली विन्यस्ता मनसो मुदं वितनुतां सद्युक्तिरेषा चिरं ॥

May that *S'iva* be auspicious, who, skilled in the sportive dance, has made a crest-gem of the moon and a bracelet of the sovereign of the snakes!

Prompted solely by regard for [my pupil] *Rájiva*, let me, as a relaxation, illustrate, by the aid of the very succinct expressions of the ancients, my own work the *Kárikávali* [the "Series of memorial verses" called also the *Bháshá parichchheda* or "The discrimination of language"

as employed technically in the philosophical system that we are now concerned with.]

This *Siddhánta-muktávali*, [the "string of the pearls of scientific tenets"] treating of Substances and Qualities, the expositor of the Actions, treating of Sameness, of Differences, and of Intimate relation, and luminous on the varieties of Nonexistence, containing excellent arguments, and deposited on the bosom of Vishṇu, by the learned *Vis'wanátha*—may it long extend the gratification of the mind of the learned.*

नूतनजलधररुचये गोपवधूटीदुकूलचौराय ।
तस्मै कृष्णाय नमः संसारमहीरुहस्य बीजाय ॥ १ ॥

1. Salutation to Kṛishṇa!—to him—lovely as a fresh cloud—the stealer of the raiment of the young women of the cowherds—the seed of the world-tree.

विघ्नविघाताय कृतं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षायै ग्रथतो निबध्नाति नूतनेत्यादि ॥

The motive for commencing with a benediction.

a. For the instruction of disciples, the author composes [not merely in his mind, but sets down] in his book, a benediction, designed for the removal of obstacles, in the foregoing terms—viz: "*as a fresh cloud &c.*"

* These verses are susceptible of a double interpretation. According to the *Dinakari* (the commentary of Mahádeva on the *Siddhánta-muktávali*), as all the Categories—Substance &c—are to be found in a string of pearls, so are they to be found in this book. Taken as descriptive of a string of un-metaphorical pearls the verses may be rendered thus:—

ननु मङ्गलं न विघ्नध्वंसं प्रति न वा समाप्तिं प्रति कारणं विनापि मङ्गलं नास्तिकादीनां ग्रन्थे निर्व्विघ्नपरिसमाप्तिदर्शनादिति चेन्न। अविगीताशिष्टाचारविषयत्वेन मङ्गलस्य सफलत्वे सिद्धे तत्र च फलजिज्ञासायां सम्भवति दृष्टफलकत्वेऽदृष्टफलकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् उपस्थितत्वाच्च समाप्तिरेव हि फलं कल्प्यते॥ इत्थञ्च यत्र मङ्गलं न दृश्यते तत्रापि जन्मान्तरीयं तत्कल्प्यते यत्र च सत्यपि मङ्गले समाप्तिर्न दृश्यते तत्र बलवत्तरो विघ्नो विघ्नप्राचुर्य्यं वा बोध्यं प्रभूरस्यास्यैव बलवत्तरविघ्ननिवारणे कारणत्वं॥

Doubts respecting the utility of a benediction.

b. "But [one may object] a benediction "is not the cause either of the destruction "of obstacles [placed in the way of an "author by his sins,] or of his completing "his work—for we see, in the case of books written by "*atheists*, the work completed without obstacles, though "there was no benediction":—If, however, you assert this, it is not so—for, the fact, that a benediction has its fruit, being established by the fact that the practice is a favourite one among blameless and eminent persons—and there being a question as to what its fruit is, it is unphilosophical

---

"This necklace of pearls, to be bought for a price, strung upon a thread, a significant token of the good deeds of well-doers [who through their good deeds in former states of existence, have attained the prosperity whereof the possession of a pearl necklace is one token] in which there are good Qualities, and Distinctions, [such as those of, size and purity], and [among the well-strung pearls of which there is] close junction, and which is exceedingly resplendent even in the absence [of light] &c."

to suppose that the fruit is something not apparent [but postponed say to another life.] when it is possible that the fruit is what we find apparent [viz. the successful completion of the work in question]. And so [i. e. since the completion of a work is the fruit of a benediction.] where a benediction is not seen, [and yet the work attains completion.] there we infer that a benediction was made in a previous state of existence. And where, even though there is a benediction, completion is *not* seen—there we must understand that some obstacle was more potent [than the benediction.] or that there was a multitude of obstacles. It is the multitude of benedictions that causes the removal of obstacles too potent [for removal by a single benediction.]

विघ्नध्वंसस्तु मङ्गलस्य द्वारमित्याहुः । नव्यास्तु मङ्गलस्य विघ्नध्वंस एव फलं समाप्तिस्तु बुद्धिप्रतिभादिकारणकलापात् ॥

A difference of opinion between the ancients and the moderns.

c. Some have said that the removal of obstacles is [—whatever else may be—] through a benediction; but the moderns hold that the removal of obstacles is the *sole* fruit of a benediction—and that the successful completion of a work depends upon a combination of causes, including brilliancy of intellect, &c.

न च स्वतःसिद्धविघ्नविरहवता कृतस्य मङ्गलस्य निष्फलत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यं । इष्टापत्तेः । विघ्नाशङ्क्या तदाचरणात् तथैव शिष्टाचरणात् ॥

d. And you need not [trouble yourself to] say "A benediction is found fruitless when made by a man who is "in himself [or *per se*, and without the aid of a benediction] not confronted by any obstacles";—for I grant you

this*—for such a man conforms to the practice under the apprehension that obstacles *may* possibly exist, and also because such is [—and there can be no harm in following—] the practice of the eminently virtuous.

न च तस्य निष्फलत्वे तद्बोधकशिष्टाचारानुमितवेदाप्रामाण्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यं। सति विघ्ने तन्नाप्तस्यैव वेदबोधितत्वात्। अत एव पापभ्रमेण कृतप्रायश्चित्तस्य निष्फलत्वेऽपि न तद्बोधकवेदाप्रामाण्यं॥

e. And although that [viz: the benediction made by the man in whose way there happen to be *no* obstacles,] should prove fruitless, [—there being no room for the fruit,—] you are not to say that "The rule inculcating the practice, "deduced from the practice of eminent persons, is thus "found to be no sound rule," for we are merely informed, by the rule, how the obstacle is to be removed if there *be* one. By parity of reasoning, although penance performed by a man, under the mistaken impression that he has committed sin, should prove fruitless, the preeept inculcating penance is not the less authoritative.

मङ्गलन्तु विघ्नध्वंसविशेषे कारणं विघ्नध्वंसविशेषे च विनायकत्वपाठादि॥ क्वचिच्च विघ्नात्यन्ताभाव एव समाप्तिसाधनं प्रति बन्धकसंसर्गाभावस्यैव कार्यजनकत्वात्। इत्थञ्च नास्तिकादिकृतग्रन्थेषु जन्मान्तरीयमङ्गलजन्यदुरितध्वंसः स्वतः सिद्धविघ्नात्यन्ताभावो वारूीति न व्यभिचार इत्याशयः॥

f. But a benediction is the cause of the removal only of *some* kinds of obstacles; and the cause of the removal

* Literally—"here what I *wish* presents itself."

of other kinds of obstacles is the reciting of the praises of Ganes'a, &c. And in some cases [I do not deny] the absolute nonexistence of obstacles is the cause of the successful completion [of a work.] for the absolute non-existence of obstacles does conduce to the production of the [desired] effect:—and thus, in the case of books made by atheists &c., either, through benedictions made in a previous state of existence, the destruction of sin [with its attendant impediments] has been produced; or else there was a personal entire freedom from obstacles:—so that these cases constitute no exception to the rule.* Such is the opinion of the moderns.

संसारेति। संसार एव महीरुहो दुश्चरस्य बीजाय। एतेन ईश्वरे प्रमाणमपि दर्शितं भवति। तथाहि। घटादिकार्यं कर्तृजन्यं तथा छिद्यङ्कुरादिकमपि न च तत्कर्तृत्वमस्मदादीनां सम्भवतीत्यतस्तत्कर्तृत्वेनेश्वरसिद्धिः॥

Considerations suggested by the terms of this benediction.

g. "*Of the world-tree*" &c. The world is here spoken of as a tree—what grows from the earth. By speaking of the "seed" of that world-tree, a proof of the existence

* The technical term *vyabhichára*, which, for the sake of clearness has been rendered freely above, means literally "*straying*". See the memorialist verse No. 138. The position laid down was this—that the making of a benediction is the cause of the removal of obstacles to the completion of a work—whence, correlatively, the completion of a work is the *sign* of a benediction's having been made. An opponent is supposed to object that this alleged sign strays away to cases where the thing signified does not accompany it—for the alleged sign, viz. unimpeded completion, is found even in the works of the atheists. The author in rejoinder contends that the sign is not thus chargeable with straying—or, in other words, that the cases instanced constitute no exception to the rule.

of the Deity is exhibited. That is to say:—such productions as a water-jar are produced by a maker, and so also are such as the sprouts of the earth:—and, to make these is not possible for such as we are; hence the existence of the Deity, as the maker of these, is demonstrated.

न च शरीराजन्यत्वेन कर्त्रजन्यत्वसाधकेन सत्प्रतिपक्ष इति वाच्यं । अप्रयोजकत्वात् । मम तु कर्तृत्वेन कार्य्यत्वेन कार्य्यकारण भाव एव अनुकूलतर्कः । द्यावाभूमी जनयन्देव एक आसीत् विश्वस्य कर्त्ता भुवनस्य गोप्ता इत्यादय आगमा अप्यनुसन्धेयाः ॥

h. And you must not say "This is a case of equally strong "arguments on both sides—since the fact that these "[sprouts of the earth] are not made by [a maker invested "with] a body, is sufficient to prove that they are not pro-"duced by a maker at all":—for this is not to the point. The proper principle on which to test the argument [see the Nyáya Aphorisms ¶ 39] is this of mine, viz:—that the relation of cause and effect implies that there is a maker as well as that there is something made. And such texts of scripture also are worthy of consideration as the following:—viz. "There is but one God, the Maker of heaven and earth—the Creator of all—the Preserver of all."

पदार्थानामुद्देशमाह । द्रव्यं गुण इत्यादि ॥

The seven Categories.

i. The author now enounces the Categories, viz. "*Substance, Quality, &c*" as follows.

द्रव्यं गुणस्तथा कर्म सामान्यं सविशेषक ।
समवायस्तथाभावः पदार्थाः सप्त कीर्त्तिताः ॥ २ ॥

II. Substance (*dravya*), Quality (*guṇa*), and in like manner* Action (*karma*), Genus (*sámánya*), with Difference (*vis'esha*), and Concretion (*samaváya*,) and in like manner Non-existence (*abháva*), these seven are called the categories (*padártha*).

सप्तमस्याभावत्वकथनादेव षण्णां भावत्वं प्राप्तं तेन भावत्वेन पृथगपन्यासो न कृतः ॥

Reduction of the Categories to two.

a. From the mere circumstance of the seventh's being called "*Non-existence*," it may be gathered that the other six are existences; therefore the fact of their being existences is not separately stated.

एते च पदार्था वैशेषिकनये प्रसिद्धा नैयायिकानामप्यविरुद्धाः प्रतिपादितश्चैवमेव भाष्ये ॥

The Categories of KAN'A'DA and of GAUTAMA reconcileable.

b. And these Categories, more especially current among the Vais'eshikas [Kaṇáda and his followers] are not opposed to those of the *Naiyáyikas* [Gautama and his followers:—and that it is not otherwise than

* The employment of the adverb "in like manner" (*tathá*.) might have been accounted for by the exigences of the metre:—but the author of the *Dinakari* assures us that the adverb is employed in the first instance to mark the writer's dissent from the opinion of the *Bhúshaṇa* (which denies a separate categorical nature to Action), and in the second instance to mark his dissent from the opinion of Prabhákara (who refuses the name of Category to Non-existence.) The employment of the word "*seven*," after seven had been exhibited, he further mentions, is for the sake of clearness.

thus, is made quite clear in the *Bháshya* [the commentary by Pras'astapáda on the aphorisms of Kaṇáda].

अत एव उपमानचिन्तामणौ सप्तपदार्थभिन्नतया शक्तिसादृश्ययोरतिरिक्तपदार्थत्वमाशङ्कितं। ननु कथमेत एव पदार्थाः शक्तिसादृश्यादीनामप्यतिरिक्तपदार्थत्वात्तथाहि मण्यादिसमवहितेन वह्निना दाहो न जन्यते तच्छून्येन तु जन्यते। तत्र मण्यादिना वह्नौ दाहानुकूलशक्तिर्नाश्यते। उत्तेजकेन मण्याद्यपसरणेन च जन्यत इति कल्प्यते। एवं सादृश्यमप्यतिरिक्तपदार्थः। तद्धि न षट्पदार्थेष्वन्तर्भवति सामान्येऽपि सत्त्वात्। यथा गोत्वं नित्यं तथा अश्वत्वमपीति सादृश्यप्रतीतेः। नाप्यभावः सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वादितिचेन्न। मण्याद्यभावविशिष्टवह्न्यादेर्दाहादिकं प्रति स्वातन्त्र्येण मण्यभावादेरेव वा हेतुत्वकल्पनेन सामञ्जस्ये। अनन्तशक्तितत्प्रागभावध्वंसकल्पनानौचित्यात्। नचात्तेजके सति मणिप्रतिबन्धकसद्भावेऽपि कथं दाह इति वाच्यं। उत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमणिसामान्याभावस्य हेतुत्वात्। सादृश्यमपि न पदार्थान्तरं किन्तु तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तद्गतभूयोधर्मवत्त्वं। यथा चन्द्रभिन्नत्वे सति चन्द्रगताह्लादकत्वादिमत्त्वं मुखे चन्द्रसादृश्यमिति॥

The question whether Power and Resemblance also are not separate Categories.

c. Thereupon [i. e. on its being laid down that the Categories are seven] the author of the *Upamána-Chintámaṇi* raises the doubt whether a right to be treated as separate categories does not belong to Power and Resemblance, seeing that these differ from all the seven Categories. "How is it [he asks] that these

"[seven] alone are Categories when there is a separate "categoric nature in Power, Resemblance, &c?—To ex- "plain:—A burn is not produced by fire when attended by "a gem [of the kind which is regarded as possessing the "power to neutralize the operation of fire,] or the like; "but, by that devoid thereof, it is produced. In this case I "infer that a cauterizing Power in the fire is destroyed "by the gem or the like, and is reproduced by the removal "of the gem or the like which acted as a neutralizer. So "too Resemblance is a separate Category,—for it is not "included under any one of the [first] six Categories, see- "ing that [unlike any of these] it exists even in Genus "—for we recognise Resemblance in the instance "that, *as the generic nature of cows is eternal, so in like "manner is that of horses also**. Further, it cannot fall "within the Category of Non-existence—because, that such "a thing [as Resemblance] exists, is believed [by every "one]". But if all this be asserted, it is not so—for, as regards the burning effect of the fire &c. in the absence of the gem † &c, it is improper to postulate an endless set of Powers together with the previous Non-existence and also the Annihilation thereof, when the result may be properly accounted for either by the independent action [of the fire] or by assuming as the cause the absence of the [neutraliz- ing] gem &c. And you need not say "How then does "burning take place when both the neutralizer is present "and also a neutralizer of the [fire-neutralizing] gem?"— for, what I regard as the cause is the absence of the

* See remarks on verse 8.

† Literally—"distinguished by the Non-existence of the gem &c."

genus gem [or of all gems whatsoever], which implies the absence of [those gems that are] neutralizers. Resemblance also is not another Category, but it consists in the possession of various characters belonging to any given thing, whilst being at the same time something other than the thing; as, for example, there is a resemblance to the Moon in a face which, being something not the Moon, yet possesses the pleasing character &c. which the Moon possesses.

द्रव्याणि विभजते ॥ क्षित्यबिति ॥

The Category of Substance divided.

d. The author now divides the Substances into "*Earth, Water,* &c," as follows.

क्षित्यप्तेजो मरुद्व्योमकाला दिग्देहिनौ मनः ।

द्रव्याणि

III. The Substances are Earth, Water, Light, Air and Time, Space and Soul, and Mind.

एतानि नव द्रव्याणि इत्यर्थः ॥

a. "These are the *nine* Substances"—such is the meaning.

ननु द्रव्यत्वजातौ किमानं । न हि तत्र प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं पृथक्त्वजन्यप्रभृतिषु द्रव्यत्वाग्रहादिति चेन्न । कार्य्यसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया संयोगस्य विभागस्य वा समवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया तत्सिद्धिरिति ॥

What is meant by Substance.

b. "But [it may be asked] what is the "evidence of there being such a thing "as the genus that constitutes any thing "a *Substance?*—for the senses [the enquirer may go on "to say:—] are not the evidence thereof, seeing that we do "not by sense discern that there is in butter, light, &c. "anything that makes it to be [what you call] a Substance ?" If any one makes this objection, he ought not—for this [viz. that there is such a genus as that of Substance] is established in the fact that there must be something which distinctively constitutes *, as such, the intimately related cause [or substratum] of a positive product, or which distinctively constitutes as such the intimately related cause [or substratum] of Conjunction and Disjunction:—[and this kind of something is what we mean by the generic nature of substance.]

ननु दृश्यमं द्रव्यत्वमः कुतो नोक्तं तद्धि प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते तस्य च रूपवत्त्वात् कर्मवत्त्वाच्च द्रव्यत्वं तच्च गन्धशून्यत्वात् न पृथिवी

* The term *avachchhedakatá*—in the sense of "The constituting distinctively"—is of frequent occurrence in the *Nyáyá-s'ástra*. In respect of a "man" (*manushya*), according to the *Nyáya*—what distinctively constitutes him a man, is his "human nature"—the genus *manushyatwa*;—and so, in respect of a jar (*ghata*), the *avachchhedaka* is the genus *ghatatwa* But for the presence of the genus—according to this view or this phraseology—the thing would not be what it is:—hence the existence of the thing, *as* such and such a thing, suffices to establish the existence of the genus in virtue whereof it *is* such and such a thing. There being no dispute that every positive product, such as a web, has an intimately related cause [see V. XI.], such as the threads, it follows that this intimately related cause has a genus, in virtue whereof it *is* an intimately related cause; and, as this genus requires a name, let it take the name of "the genus of Substance" (*dravyatwa*),

नीलरूपवत्त्वाच्च न जलादिकं तत्प्रत्यक्षे चालोकनिरपेक्षं चक्षुः कारणं इति चेन्न । आवश्यकतेजोऽभावेनोपपत्तौ द्रव्यान्तरकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । रूपवत्ताप्रतीतिस्तु भ्रमरूपा । कर्म्मवत्त्वप्रतीतिरपि आलोकापसारणोपाधिकी भ्रान्तिरेव । तमसोऽतिरिक्तत्वेऽनन्तावयवादिकल्पनागौरवञ्च स्यात् ॥

The question whether or not darkness is a substance.

c. "But why is Darkness* not stated as "a tenth substance—for it is apprehended "through the senses; and, by its possessing colour, [viz. blue] and action [inasmuch as it comes, and goes,] it is proved to have the nature of Substance † [§ 3. *b*] and it is not Earth, for it is "destitute of odour; and it is not Water nor any of the rest, "[of the substances thereafter enumerated in the text] for "it possesses blue colour [which is held to belong to no substance besides earth]; and the sight is the cause of its perception independently of the aid of light [which the sight is "not in regard to any thing else ‡]?"—if all this be asserted, it is not so—for since it [viz. Darkness] is produced by the non-existence of Light, which is necessarily held to be an entity, it is unphilosophical to postulate another substance [to account for it]. The belief that it possesses colour is erroneous. The belief also that Action belongs to it is quite a mistake originating in the indispensable condition ¶ that Light goes away [when Darkness is erroneously regarded as coming on]. And by assuming that darkness is a

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* As it is by the followers of the *Mimānsā* school. See Jaimini's Aphorisms.

† Substance being that to which Qualities and Actions belong.

‡ See verse 55.

¶ For the technical import of the term *upādhi*, see under verse 139

distinct substance, there would be [forced upon us] the cumbrous supposition of innumerable constituent portions &c. [instead of the simple supposition of its consisting in the mere absence of an already recognised substance.]

सुवर्णस्य यथा तेजस्यन्तर्भावस्तथा वक्ष्यते ॥

d. How Gold is included under the head of Light, will be explained further on.*

गुणान् विभजते । अथ गुणा इति ॥

The Category of Quality divided.

e. He now divides the Qualities—saying "*Now the Qualities*" &c., as follows.

अथ गुणा रूपं रसो गन्धस्ततः परं ॥ ३ ॥
स्पर्शः संख्या परिमितिः पृथक्त्वञ्च ततः परं ।
संयोगश्च विभागश्च परत्वञ्चापरत्वकं ॥ ४ ॥
बुद्धिः सुखं दुःखमिच्छा द्वेषो यत्नो गुरुत्वकं ।
द्रवत्वं स्नेहसंस्कारावदृष्टं शब्द एव च ॥ ५ ॥

IV. Now the Qualities are Colour (*rūpa*), Savour (*rasa*), Odour (*gandha*), Tangibility (*spars'a*), Number (*sankhyá*), Magnitude (*parimiti*), Severalty (*prithaktwa*), Conjunction (*sanyoga*), Disjunction (*vibhága*), Posteriority (*aparatwa*), Priority (*paratwa*), Knowledge (*buddhi*), Pleasure (*sukha*), Pain (*du'kha*), Desire (*ichchhá*), Aversion (*dwesha*), Effort (*yatna*), Gravity (*gurutwa*), Fluidity (*dravatwa*), Viscidity (*sneha*) Self-reproductive quality (*sanskára*), the Unseen (*adrishta*), and Sound (*s'abda*),

* See under verse 42.

एते गुणाश्चतुर्विंशतिसंख्यकाः कणादेन कण्ठतश्च शब्देन च दर्शिताः ॥ तत्र गुणत्वादिकजातिसिद्धिरग्रे वक्ष्यते ॥

a. These are the Qualities, twenty-four in number, exhibited by Kaṇāda partly in words at length and partly through the "and" [or "&c." following those so enumerated]*. How it is established that there are such kinds of things as Qualities &c, will be explained hereafter.

कर्म्माणि विभजते ॥ उत्क्षेपणमिति ॥

The Category of Action divided.

b. He now subdivides the Actions—saying "Elevation" &c—as follows.

उत्क्षेपणं ततोऽपक्षेपणमाकुञ्चनं तथा ।
प्रसारणञ्च गमनं कर्म्माण्येतानि पञ्च च ॥ ६ ॥
भ्रमणं रेचनं स्यन्दनोर्द्ध्वज्वलनमेवच ।
तिर्य्यग्गमनमप्यच्च गमनादेव लभ्यते ॥ ७ ॥

V. Elevation (*utkshepaṇa*), Depression (*apakshepaṇa*), Contraction (*ákunchana*), Dilatation (*prasárana*), and Motion (*gamana*),—these are the five Actions. Revolution, Evacuation, Throbbing, Blazing up, and Crooked motion are here included under the head of Motion.

कर्म्मत्वजातिस्तु प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा । एवमुत्क्षेपणत्वादिकमपि ॥

a. The fact that there is such a thing as Action (*karmma*), is established by the senses—and so is it in regard to [the subdivisions] Elevation &c.

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* See Kaṇáda's Aphorisms, No. 6.

नन्वत्र भ्रमणादिकमपि पञ्चकर्म्माधिकतया कुतो नोक्तमत आह भ्रमणमित्यादि ॥

b. "Now [some one—if he were to see mention made of "only five Actions—might ask] why is Revolution, or the "like, not set forth here under the character of one over "and above these *five* Actions"? In anticipation of this, the author [in the foregoing verses] says "*Revolution* &c."*

सामान्यं निरूपयति । सामान्यमिति ॥

c. He now describes Genus—saying "Genus" &c.—as follows.

सामान्यं द्विविधं प्रोक्तं परञ्चापरमेव च ।
द्रव्यादिचिकवृत्तिस्तु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ॥ ८ ॥
परभिन्ना च या जातिः सैवापरतयोच्यते ।
द्रव्यत्वादिकजातिस्तु परापरतयोच्यते ॥ ९ ॥
व्यापकत्वात्परापि स्याद्व्याप्यत्वादपरापि च ।

VI. Sameness *(sámánya)* is declared to be of two kinds [corresponding to *genus* and *species*, and named respectively] 'further extending' *(para)* and 'less far extending' (*apara*). Existence, residing in those three Categories the first of which in Substance, is called [only] 'further extending' [Existence being the *summum genus*]. Only such a genus as is other than this, is called 'less far ex-

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* Another objection, not noticed in the *Siddhánta-muktávali*, will probably occur to the reader;—viz; that the first four kinds of Action are included under the fifth. As for the propriety of viewing the matter otherwise, the *Dinakari* observes that we must take Kaṇáda's word for it. See Kaṇáda's Aphorisms No. 7. *b.*

tending." A genus such as that of substance is called both "further extending" and "less far extending." Let it be called "further extending" when it pervades, and "less far extending" when it is pervaded.*

तल्लक्षणन्तु नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतत्वं ॥

The Category of Genus defined.

a. The definition of Genus is as follows—viz. that which, being eternal, requires as its intimately related cause,† more than one.

अनेकसमवेतत्वं संयोगादीनामप्यस्यत उक्तं नित्यत्वे सतीति । नित्यत्वे सति समवेतत्वं गगणपरिमाणादीनामप्यस्यत उक्तं अनेकेति । नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकवृत्तित्वमत्यन्ताभावेऽप्यस्यतो वृत्तित्वसामान्यं विहाय समवेतत्वमित्युक्तं ॥

The definition justified.

b. [To show that none of the terms in this definition are superfluous, it may be remarked that] the necessity for *more than one*, to constitute its intimate cause, belongs to [the quality called] Conjunction also;‡—therefore [in the foregoing definition] we say "*being eternal.*"¶ In such instances as the Magnitude of Space, we find inherence in an intimately united cause, whilst there *is* eternity also:—therefore we say "*more than one*"‖ In absolute Non-existence we have

* Thus the genus 'quadruped' extends further than the genus 'cow', and less far than the genus 'animal'.

† See verse 18.

‡ See IV.

¶ And Conjunction is not eternal, for Disjunction may put an end to it.

‖ The Sky, or Ether, filling all space, is but one. It is the intimate-

an instance of what *resides* in more than one, whilst there is eternity also:—therefore, avoiding the general expression "residing in" (*vritti*), we employ the specific expression "intimately related" (*samaveta.*) *

एकमात्रव्यक्तिवृत्तित्वं न जातिः । तथाचोक्तं। व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्करोऽथानवस्थितिः । रूपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधकसंग्रहः ॥ एकव्यक्तिकत्वादाकाशत्वं न जातिः । तुल्यव्यक्तिकत्वात् घटत्वं कलशत्वं न जातिद्वयं । सङ्कीर्णत्वात् भूतत्वं मूर्त्तत्वं न जातिः । अनवस्थाभयात् सामान्यत्वं न जातिः । विशेषस्य व्यावृत्तस्वभावस्य रूपहानिः स्यात् अतो विशेषत्वं न जातिः । समवायसम्बन्धाभावात् समवाये न जातिः ॥

Cases where Genus is not found.

c. What resides in only one individual, is not a genus:—and so it has been declared † as follows:—(1) "There being none "besides the individual, (2) identity, (3) intermixture, (4) in- "stability [or *regressus in infinitum*,] (5) want of character, "and (6) the want of a bond of union,—such is the summary "of what is incompatible with genus." For example—(1) the nature of the Ether is not a genus, because there is but one individual Ether. (2) The nature of a water-jar (*ghaṭa*) and that of a jar for water (*kalas'a*,) do not constitute a couple

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ly united cause (which may be here rendered the "material cause") of its own Qualities, such as Magnitude &c.

* The unlimited Non-existence, for example, of Colour, resides eternally in Soul, Time, Ether, and the like—but its relation to these is not that of the intimate kind termed *samavâya* (see verse eleven), for it is not *dependent on* these or on any other Substance.

† By UDAYANA A'CHA'RYYA in the *Kiraṇávali*.

of genera, for the two names denote the same individual jar. (3) Neither the fact of being an element (*bhúta*) nor of being limited (*múrta*,) is a genus—because of the confused blending* [of these two classes]. (4) The nature of genus is not a genus—for, at that rate, we should never stop.† (5) There must be wanting any common character in mere Differences [which constitute the fifth of the Categories and] which are essentially the *un*-like; hence there is no such genus as the nature of Difference.‡ (6) No genus belongs to the Relation named Intimate, [the sixth of the Categories], for [since a genus is related to that whereof it is the genus by the relation named Intimate, *if* that relation were taken as the possessor of a genus] there would be no Intimate relation to serve as the bond [between its genus and itself ¶].

द्रव्यादीति ॥ परत्वं अधिकदेशवृत्तित्वं । अपरत्वं अल्पदेश वृत्तित्वं । सकलजात्यपेक्षयाऽधिकदेशवृत्तित्वात् सत्तायाः परत्वं । एतद्बोधनायैव द्रव्यादित्रिकवृत्तिरित्युक्तं । तदपेक्षया चान्यासां जातीनामपरत्वं परभिन्ना सत्ताभिन्ना । व्यापकत्वादिति । पृथिवीत्वा दपेक्षया व्यापकत्वादधिकदेशवृत्तित्वात् द्रव्यत्वादेः परत्वं सत्तापेक्षया व्याप्यत्वात् अल्पदेशवृत्तित्वाच्च द्रव्यत्वस्यापरत्वं ॥

Division of genus into higher and lower.

d. "*The first of which is Substance*" &c [v. 8]. The being "further extending," means the occupying a greater sphere;

* The one class including Ether and excluding Mind.—(see V. 26), whilst the other includes Mind and excludes Ether.—(see V. 25).

† That is to say, if genus had a genus, then that genus would have its genus, and so on *ad infinitum*.

‡ See § VII. *a*. ¶ See V 11.

and the being "less far extending," means the occupying a smaller sphere. Existence, as it occupies a greater sphere than any other genus, can be called "further extending" only—[Existence being the most comprehensive or the highest of all—the *summum genus*]. In order to intimate this, the author says [in v. 8.] "*residing in the three Categories the first of which is Substance.*"* In relation to it, all other genera are "lower." [By the expression in v. 9.] "*other than this*" [he means] other than Existence. "*When it pervades*" &c. [v. 10.]:—In relation to the nature of Earth &c. the nature of Substance is a higher genus, because it pervades —i. e.—it occupies that extent and more:—but, in relation to Existence, the nature of Substance is a lower [or subaltern] genus, because it is pervaded—i. e.—it occupies a smaller extent. †

तथाच धर्म्मद्वयसमावेशाद्भयमविरुद्धं ॥

e. And thus, as two natures may reside in any thing, the two characters [of being relatively both a higher and subaltern genus] are not inter-repugnant.

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* No genus besides Existence belongs to each and all of the three Categories of Substance, Quality, and Action.

† "Pervasion" (*vyápti*) consists (see v. 68) in the fact that some thing or other, which we may designate as P, is to be found wherever something else, which we may designate as S, presents itself—and possibly also elsewhere. Thus, for example, where Earth (S) presents itself, there we find Substance (P) and where Substance (S) presents itself, there we find Existence (P);—but, on the other hand, we find Existence (P) where Substance (S) does not present itself—for example in a Quality; and we find Substance (P) where Earth (S) does not present itself—for example in the shape of Soul. In each of these

विशेषं निरूपयति ॥ अन्त्य इति ॥

The Category of Difference described.

f. He now describes Difference—saying "*Ultimate*" &c.—as follows.

अन्त्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिर्विशेषः परिकीर्त्तितः ॥ १० ॥

VII. Ultimate Difference is that which resides in eternal Substances.

अन्ते अवसाने वर्त्तत इत्यन्त्यः । यदपेक्षया विशेषो नास्तीत्यर्थः । एकमात्रवृत्तिरिति फलितार्थः । घटादीनां द्व्यणुकपर्य्यन्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदात् परस्परं भेदः । परमाणूनां परस्परभेदको विशेष एव । स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तः । तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्तीति भावः ॥

a. By "*ultimate*" is meant, that which is at the end—when we come to a pause;—that is to say, that in respect of which there is no further difference;—that which resides in one only—such is the sense in which this may be profitably understood. The mutual difference of water-jars &c., down to a combination of two atoms, arises from the difference of the component parts of each. The mutual difference of Atoms is Difference simply:—but this [Difference] is differenced through itself only [and not

pairs, P and S designate respectively the "pervader" (*vyápaka*) and the "pervaded" (*vyápya*). In a true proposition, the terms of which are not coextensive, the "pervaded" is the Subject; and the pervader is connoted by the Predicate. Thus, in the true proposition that "All men are mortal," the "mortality" connoted by the Predicate "mortal" is found wherever we have "man."

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through its possessing a nature common—see* VI. c.—to other differences]:—therefore there is no ulterior difference to be looked for in it:—such is the state of the case [implied in calling Difference "*ultimate*"].

समवायं दर्शयति ॥ घटादीनामिति ॥

The Category of Intimate Relation described.

b. He now describes Intimate Relation—saying "Of water-jars &c." as follows.

घटादीनां कपालादौ द्रव्येषु गुणकर्म्मणोः ।
तेषु जातेश्च सम्बन्धः समवायः प्रकीर्त्तितः ॥ ११ ।

VIII. Of water-jars &c. in their bowl-shaped halves &c, of Quality and Action in Substances, and of Genus in [all] those, the inherence is called Intimate Relation (*samavāya*).

अवयवावयविनोर्जातिव्यक्त्योर्गुणगुणिनोः क्रियाक्रियावतो र्नित्यद्रव्यविशेषयोश्च यः सम्बन्धः स समवायः । समवायत्वं नित्यसम्बन्धत्वं ॥

a. Between parts and what is made up of the parts, between genus and individuals, between action and agent, and between eternal substances and their respective differences, what relation subsists, that we call Intimate relation. That the relation is Intimate, consists in its being constant.

* A jar differs from a web of cloth, because the two halves of the jar differ from the two halves of the web of cloth. These halves, again, differ, because their respective halves differ:—and thus, in the case of things that differ, a ground of difference can be assigned—down to the

तत्र प्रमाणन्तु गुणक्रियादिविशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात् दण्डी पुरुष इति विशिष्टबुद्धिवत् इत्यनुमाने संयोगादिबाधात् समवायसिद्धिः ॥

b. The proof that there is such a thing, is the fact of knowledge [—the object being, suppose, a jar which is known as] *distinguished* by a Quality [—as when we know the jar to be red—] or by an Action [—as when we know the jar to be falling—] &c., such knowledge having as its object the relation *(sambandha)* between the differencer *(vis'eshaṇa)* and the thing thereby differenced *(vis'eshya)*; —for there is such a thing as *differenced* knowledge,* such, for example, as that of "a man carrying a staff"—where the knowledge [which might have

Proof that there is such a relation as that called Intimate.

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case of binary atoms. These differ because the atoms which constitute their halves differ:—but, why Atoms—which are indivisible—differ, cannot be thus accounted for. If we say that two atoms differ because they are not the same atom—we are, in effect, saying that they differ because they differ,—an assertion tantamount to the statement in the text, that Ultimate Difference is "differenced through itself only."

All "eternal substances"—Time and Space for example—are held to differ in this simple and inexplicable way. Time is not Space,—but why, we can give no account of.

This *ultimate* Difference (*vis'esha*,) which the strict followers of GAUTAMA reject (see Note on § II—), is not to be confounded with the logical *differentia* (*lakshaṇa*) employed in *definition*. The differentia is a "Predicable," but Kaṇàda's *vis'esha* is a "Predicament." See Mill's Logic, Book I. chap. 7 § 2; and chap. 3 § 1.

* That is to say—there is such a thing as the knowledge that may be conveyed by a proposition—knowledge referring to the relation between a subject and a predicate.

been of "a man" indifferently] is differenced [by the consideration of his being one "carrying a staff"]. Now, this general proposition being agreed to—[viz., that the knowledge in such a case as that of a jar known to be coloured is concerned about a *relation*—such as the relation of subject to attribute—] it is clear that there exists [some *special* relation, to which—as well as any other name—we may give the name of] "Intimate Relation";—for it would be absurd to say that the relation [between a substance and its qualities] is that of [mere] conjunction or the like.

न च स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन सिद्धसाधनं अर्थान्तरं वा अनन्तस्वरूपाणां सम्बन्धत्वकल्पने गौरवात् लाघवादेकसमवायसिद्धिः ।

c. And you must not object [—as the followers of the *Mímánsá* do—] that we are here establishing what [does not require to be established—the case being one which] is already provided for by [what these objectors choose to call] the relation constituted by the nature of the things; nor must you say that we have proved something else than we undertook to prove [—committing the *ignoratio elenchi* of establishing the *Mímánsá* tenet instead of our own]. We prove our point, that there is such a thing as "Intimate Relation," by [instancing] the cumbrousness of the theory which supposes an endless number of natures to act each the part of a relation,* and by the simplicity [of our own preferable view].

* The objector is understood to contend that as, in the case of there being the non-existence of a jar in any spot,—see § VIII. *c.*—there is the spot itself and the non-existence of the jar itself, and nothing else concerned in the case,—so too, in the case of a Substance and its inherent Qualities, there is the Substance itself, and the Qualities them-

न च समवायस्यैकत्वे वायौ रूपवत्ताबुद्धिप्रसङ्गः तत्र रूपसम वायसत्त्वेऽपि रूपाभावात् ।

d. Nor is it the case that, if Intimate Relation be but one only, we must find the [colourless] Air to be possessed of colour,*—for, whilst that Intimate Relation by which colour is associated [with coloured substances] *does* exist in Air, there is [in Air] the non-existence of any colour [—though colour, if present, would of course be associated through this relation].

न चैवं अभावस्य वैशिष्ट्यं सम्बन्धान्तरं सिध्येदिति वाच्यं । तस्य नित्यत्वे । भूतले घटानयनानन्तरमपि घटाभावबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । घटाभावसम्बन्धस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् । तस्य नित्यत्वात् । अन्यथा देशान्तरेऽपि तत्प्रतीतिर्न स्यात् । वैशिष्ट्यस्य च तत्र सत्त्वात् । मम तु मते घटे पाकरक्ततादशायां श्यामरूपस्य नष्टत्वान्न तद्वत्ताबुद्धिः । वैशिष्ट्यस्यानित्यत्वे । त्वनन्तवैशिष्ट्यकल्पने तवैव गौरवं । इत्यश्च तत्तत्कालीनतत्तद्भूतत्वादिकं तत्तदभावानां सम्बन्धः ॥

e. Nor is it to be said that "In this way, then, it would "follow that the differencing,† [—the *vais'ishtya*, which the

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selves, and nothing else concerned in the case. Hence if there be a relation—as both parties agree there is—then the natures of these themselves must constitute it.

* The objection implies that if this Relation is but one individua thing, it must everywhere carry along with it all the Qualities &c., which only through this one relation, inhere in substances;—and hence every substance, in which the relation is found, ought to be found possessed of every quality, &c.

† The spot of ground on which no jar stands is, by the non-existence of a jar there, *differenced* from the spot on which a jar does stand.

"followers of the *Mímánsá* speak of as the relation of a "locality and] of a Non-existence [there located] is another "species of Relation [—this, by your own admission, not "being the relation which you call 'Intimate,' and this, "any more than that Intimate Relation which you postulate, "not being the relation of mere Conjunction or the "like":—well—we repeat,—this is not to be said,] because [let us ask,—do you hold this *vais'ishṭya*, that you speak of, to be something eternal or something non-eternal?—] if it were something eternal, then the Non-existence of the jar would be recognised on the ground even after the bringing of the jar,—because this *relation* of the Non-existence of the jar [to the spot of ground] still exists there, and *it* [viz., the Non-existence thus related] is [by all allowed to be] eternal [and cannot cease to be there]; otherwise it would not [—being but *one**]—be recognised on any other spot either,—and [as aforesaid] there is present the *vais'ishṭya* [which you hold to be the relation between the two;—hence, on your hypothesis, the jar must be recognised as absent at the same time when it is perceived to be present,—which is absurd]. But [if you attempt to retort this argument upon *me*, contending that I ought, at this rate, to hold that when a water-jar, by being baked in the kiln, loses its black colour and becomes red, it ought still to be recognised as *black*, because the *relation* which I call "Intimate," which united the blackness with

* Holding the absolute non-existence of a jar to be *one* non-existence, and not a number of non-existences, the author contends that it is not destroyed in any particular spot even by the placing of the jar upon the spot,—for, if it were thus destroyed, then it could be found nowhere else,—or, in other words, we should find the jar itself *everywhere*.

the jar, is eternal and indestructible;—then I reply that you overlook an important distinction between the two cases, because], according to *my* theory, it is because the black colour has been *destroyed*, in a jar which is red from having been burnt, that we do not recognise it as possessing that [black colour which belonged to it in its unburnt state,—although the relation survives which united it with that colour so long as the colour remained. And you must observe that whilst I am entitled to speak of a *colour* as being destroyed, you are debarred, by your own admission, from speaking of the absolute *Non-existence* of any thing as being destroyed. Well,—having disposed of the present objection on the supposition that the relation termed *vais'ishṭya* is eternal, let us see whether the objection will avail on the alternative supposition that the relation is *not* eternal;—and, with respect to this, I say that] if this *vais'ishṭya* is *not* eternal, then there is [an unphilosophical] cumbrousness in your postulating an endless number of [transitory] relations termed *vais'ishṭya* [which, in that case, * you will be constrained to postulate]. And thus, [to conclude],—the relation of [this or that spot and] the non-existences of this or that [which is absent from the spot] is this or that ground†, or the like, *of the time being* [—i. e. at the time when this or that *is* absent therefrom].

अभावं विभजते । अभावश्चेति ॥

f. He now subdivides Non-existence—saying "*But Non-existence*" &c., as follows:—

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* See § VIII. *c.*

† It may seem strange to talk of a *substance* as acting the part of a *relation*, but a relation is here regarded as a bond of connection,—like the link intermediate between two links of a chain which serves as their bond of connection.

The Category of Non-existence divided.

अभावस्तु द्विधा संसर्गान्योन्याभावभेदतः ।

प्रागभावस्तथा ध्वंसो ऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एवच ॥ १२ ॥
एवं चैविध्यमापन्नः संसर्गाभाव इष्यते ।

IX. But Non-existence (*abhāva*) is two-fold, through the distinction into Non-relative *(sansarga)* and Relative *(anyonya)* Non-existence. Non-relative Non-existence is held to have a three-fold character—being Antecedent Non-existence *(prágabháva)*, so too Destruction *(dhwan'sa)*, and also Absolute Non-existence *(atyantábháva)*.

अभावत्वं द्रव्यादिषट्कान्योन्याभाववत्त्वं ॥

Non-existence defined.

a, What constitutes Non-existence is the possession of the Relative Non-existence* of the set of six beginning with Substance.

'संसर्गेति । संसर्गाभावान्योन्याभावभेदादित्यर्थः ॥

b. "Non-relative" &c. Through the distinction into Non-relative Non-existence and Relative [or Mutual] Non-existence—such is the meaning.

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* Relative Non-existence being tantamount to *difference*, Non-existence is thus defined as being what *differs* from existence. It thus includes whatever does not fall under any of the six other Categories. Darkness, for example, being rejected, as we have seen, under c. III., by the other Categories, falls under the present one:—it is the Non-existence of Light.

अन्योन्याभावस्यैकविधत्वात्तद्विभागाभावात् । संसर्गाभावं विभजते । प्रागभाव इति ॥ संसर्गाभावत्वं अन्योन्याभावभिन्नाभावत्वं । अन्योन्याभावत्वं तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावत्वं । विनाश्यभावत्वं प्रागभावत्वं । जन्याभावत्वं ध्वंसत्वं । नित्यसंसर्गाभावत्वं अत्यन्ताभावत्वं ॥

c. Since Relative Non-existence, as being of only one kind, has no divisions, he [does not divide *it*, but he] divides Non-relative Non-existence—saying "*Antecedent Non-existence*" &c. What constitutes Non-relative Non-existence is the being a Non-existence other than Relative Non-existence. What constitutes Relative Non-existence is the being a Non-existence the opposite of which is this or that—in so far forth as this or that stands towards itself in the relation of identity. The generic character of Antecedent Non-existence consists in its being destructible—[by the production of the thing which did not previously exist]. The generic character of Destruction [as a variety of Non-existence] consists in its being producible. The generic character of Absolute Non-existence consists in its being [like the two preceding] a Non-relative Non-existence [but, unlike the two preceding,] eternal [i. e. neither destructible nor produced].

यत्र तु भूतलादौ घटादिकमपसारितं पुनरानीतञ्च तत्र घटकालस्य सम्बन्धाघटकतया अत्यन्ताभावस्य नित्यत्वेऽपि घटकाले न घटात्यन्ताभावबुद्धिः । तत्र उत्पादविनाशशाली चतुर्थोऽयम

भाव इति कश्चित्। अत्र ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरधिकरणानात्यन्ताभाव इति प्राचीनमतं। श्यामघटे रक्तो नास्तीति रक्तघटे श्यामोनास्तीति धीश्च प्रागभावध्वंसत्वावगाहते न तु तदत्यन्ताभावं। नव्यास्तु तत्र विरोधे मानाभावात् ध्वंसादिकालावच्छेदेनाप्यत्यन्ताभावो वर्त्तत इति प्राञ्चः।

d. But where, in the case of a spot of ground or the like, a jar or the like is removed and again brought back, —there, although Absolute Non-existence is eternal, the absolute non-existence of the jar is not recognised at the time when the jar is present, because the time of the jar [i. e. the jar's presence at the time] disunites the connection [between the non-existence and the spot]. In consideration of this, some persons hold that the fourth kind of Non-existence [instead of being absolute or eternal] is one whose wont is to be [alternately] produced and destroyed. It was the opinion of the ancients that, in a case of Destruction and of Antecedent Non-existence, Absolute Non-existence is not concerned,—for they argued that the conception that a black [un-baked] jar is not red, or that in a red [baked] jar there remains not the black colour, is one concerned about the Antecedent Non-existence and the Destruction [of the colours, respectively], but not about the Absolute Non-existence thereof. The moderns, on the other hand, have determined that even at the time of Destruction &c., there *is* Absolute non-existence,—because there is no proof that there is any incompatibility between them [—and the onus probandi rests upon those who may choose to assert that there is].

नन्वस्तु अभावानामधिकरणात्मकत्वं लाघवादिति चेन्न। अनन्ता धिकरणात्मकत्वकल्पनामपेक्ष्यातिरिक्तकल्पनाया एव धीयस्त्वात्।

एवञ्च आधाराधेयभावोऽप्युपपद्यते। एवञ्च तत्तच्छब्दगन्धरसाद्य भावानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमुपपद्यते। अन्यथा तत्तदधिकरणानां तत्तदिन्द्रि याणामयाह्यत्वादप्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात्। एतेन ज्ञानविशेषकालविशेषाद्या त्मकत्वमत्यन्ताभावस्येति प्रत्युक्तं अप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तेः॥

c. But [a follower of the *Mīmánsá* may say] "let it be "held that Non-existences consist of the places [where "any given thing is non-existent*], for this is the simple "hypothesis [—a place where a jar is non-existent being "nothing more than the place without the jar],":—if this be said, it is not so—for it is still more simple to suppose just one separate [category—viz., that of Non-existence] than to suppose that this [category] is made up of an endless number of *places* [serving in turn as the Non-existences of whatever does not there exist]. And only on this supposition is there the relation of container and contained [in which the cognition of the ground, as devoid of a jar, consists—for if there be but the ground, then where are the terms to constitute any relation]? And only on this supposition can the non-existences of such and such sounds, odours, and flavours, come to be objects of sense-perception:—for otherwise, since the various places of *these* [non-existences] are not cognizable by their appropriate organs of sense†, they themselves would not be objects of sense-perception. Hence we deny that Absolute Non-existence consists of a species of notion, or a

* The non-existence of a jar in any spot being, according to this view, neither more nor less than the spot of ground simply.

† For example—the ear perceives the absence of sound in the Ether when silence reigns, but the ear does not perceive the Ether itself;—and the silent Ether, which is *not* perceived, cannot be that absence of sound which *is* perceived.

species of time &c., for [if such were the case] it would not be an object of *sense-perception**.

इदानीं पदार्थानां साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं च वक्तुं प्रक्रमते। सप्तानामि त्यादि ॥

In what respects the Categories resemble and differ.

d. He now proceeds to state the respects wherein the Categories are homogeneous and heterogeneous—saying "*of the seven*" &c., as follows.

सप्तानामपि साधर्म्यं ज्ञेयत्वादिकमुच्यते ॥ १३ ॥
द्रव्यादयः पञ्च भावा अनेके समवायिनः ।
सत्तावन्तस्त्रयस्त्वाद्या गुणादिर्निर्गुणक्रियः ॥ १४ ॥

X. The properties common to all the seven are declared to be Cognizability &c. The five categories of Existence, beginning with Substance, are multitudinous, and can stand in the relation called Intimate. The first three are possessed of reality. Quality and those following have neither Quality nor Action.

समानो धर्म्मो येषां ते सधर्म्माणः। तेषां भावः साधर्म्यं। समानो धर्म्म इति फलितार्थः। एवं विरुद्धो धर्म्मो येषां ते विधर्म्माणः। तेषां भावः वैधर्म्यं। विरुद्धो धर्म्म इति फलितार्थः ॥

a. Those things the characters of which are similar are called homogeneous; and their nature [in respect there-

* When, on the removal of a jar, we see the ground on which it stood, we *see* that the jar is not there,—or, in the language of the Nyáya, we see the Non-existence of the jar. Non-existence, therefore, is regarded as an object of sense-perception.

of] homogeneousness—similar character—such is the sense in which the term will be found of use. In like manner, those things the characters of which are dissimilar are called heterogeneous; and their nature [in respect thereof] heterogeneousness—dissimilar character—such is the sense in which the term will be found of use.

ज्ञेयत्वं ज्ञानविषयता सा च सर्व्वत्रैवास्ति । ईश्वरादिज्ञानविषयतायाः केवलान्वयित्वात् । एवं अभिधेयत्वप्रमेयत्वादिकं बोध्यं ॥

Characters common to all the Categories.

b. "*Cognizability*" is the being an object of cognition; and this exists in every thing, for—a thing's being an object of cognition, to the Lord at least, is a fact susceptible only of being affirmatively predicated. The same is to be understood of Namableness, Demonstrability, and the like.

द्रव्येति । द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसामान्यविशेषाणां साधर्म्यमनेकत्वं समवायित्वञ्च ॥

Characters common to only certain of the Categories.

c. "*Substance*" &c. The common property of Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, and Difference, is Plurality* and capacity† for Intimate relation.

यद्यप्यनेकत्वं अभावेऽप्यस्ति तथाप्यनेकत्वे सति भावत्वं पञ्चानां साधर्म्यं तथाच। अनेकभाववृत्तिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्त्वं फलितार्थः । तेन घटादौ प्रत्येकं नाव्याप्तिः ॥

* The Substances are nine, the Qualities twenty-four, and so on. Intimate relation is held to be *one* only.

† A Substance and its Qualities, for example, are connected through this relation. See § VIII. *a*.

d. Although [it might be objected that] Plurality belongs to Non-existence also*, yet [what it is meant to lay down as] the common character of the five [last mentioned] is Existence, in addition to Plurality:—and so [in respect of our statement of what constitutes the point of agreement in the first five categories] the meaning that will be found of use is this—viz., that each [of these five Categories] possesses some character, divisive† of the categories, which character resides in more *entities* than one. Hence [although some one, on first hearing our statement that the agreement is in respect of a character that belongs to *more than one*, might think that this would exclude, suppose an *individual* substance, yet, understood thus,] it does *not* fail to include things severally—as a jar or the like, [for the character of being a substance, which resides in many jars, resides in each jar severally].

समवायित्वं समवायसम्बन्धेन सम्बन्धित्वं न तु समवायवत्त्वं सामान्यादावभावात् । तथाच समवेतवृत्तिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्त्वं फलितार्थः । तेन नित्यद्रव्येषु नाव्याप्तिः ॥

e. Intimate relatedness means the being united through the relation called Intimate—*(samavāya)*; but not the *possession*‡ of this relation—for it does not belong to genus

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* This being held to be of *four* kinds—see v. XII.

† The special character of each category divides it from the others. Thus the character of being an Action places that to which the character belongs under another head than that of Substance or Quality &c.

‡ Substance is held to *possess* the relation called Intimate, and through this it is united with its Genus; but the Genus does not possess it, and can therefore have, for example, no genus of its own. The theory may be familiarly illustrated by the kind of clasp called a

and the categories following, [although these are united to substances by means of it]; and so [when we speak of the "capacity for intimate relation" as the common property of the first five categories,] the meaning [that will be found of use is this, viz., that each of these five categories possesses some character, divisive of the categories [among themselves], which character resides in what is capable of standing in the relation called Intimate. Hence it is not the case [—as you might inadvertently imagine—] that the definition excludes eternal substances [such as the Atoms, which *do* stand in this relation to whatever is formed out of them, though there is nothing beyond the Atoms themselves with which they can be intimately united as their substratum].

सत्तावन्त इति । द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मणां सत्तावत्त्वमित्यर्थः ।

f. "*Possessed of positive existence*" &c.:—that is to say—positive existence *(sattā)* belongs to Substance, Quality, and Action.

गुणादिरिति । यद्यपि गुणक्रियाशून्यत्वमाद्यत्वे घटादावतिव्याप्तं क्रियाशून्यत्वञ्च गगणादावतिव्याप्तं तथापि गुणवदवृत्तिधर्म्मवत्त्वं कर्म्मवदवृत्तिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्त्वं तदर्थः । नहि घटत्वादिकं द्रव्यत्वं वा गुणवदवृत्ति कर्म्मवदवृत्ति वा किन्तु गुणत्वादिकं तथा । व्योमाश्रत्वादिकन्तु न पदार्थविभाजकोपाधिः ॥

"hook and eye." Substance is provided not only with the "eyes" but with the "hooks," and is thereby hooked on to its qualities and genera. Genus possesses the "eyes" only. It is to the "hook" that the name of the category (*samavāya*) is appropriated.

g. "*Quality and those following*", &c. Although the character of being devoid of Quality and Action [laid down in the text as distinguishing all the other categories from that of substance] extends, over and above, to [such a substance as] a jar or the like at the first instant [of its becoming a jar or the like*] ; and the being devoid of Action extends, over and above, to the Ether, &c., [though a a Substance]; yet the meaning of the statement is [this, that, what distinguishes all the other categories from that of Substance is] the fact of possessing a character which does not reside in that which has qualities, and the fact of possessing a character which is divisive of the categories [from one another] but which does reside in that which possesses Action [—i. e. which is movable]; for—the fact of being a jar or the like, or the fact of being a substance, is not non-resident in that which has qualities, or non-resident in that which has action [or motion],—but the fact of being a *quality* is so [—i. e., the fact of being a quality belongs not to that in which the quality resides, but to the quality itself]. But the fact of being the Ether, or any of those following it in the list, is not a character which is divisive of the *categories* [from one another,—for these

* The Qualities of a jar depend upon those of its bowl-shaped halves —its Colour on their Colour. its Magnitude on their Magnitude. *After* the junction of the halves. the jar possesses Qualities—but not before, when it did not exist as a jar at all, nor (according to our author) at the incipient limit of its existence as a jar—when its duration *as a jar* is equal to zero. It must first *be* a jar, before it can have the qualities of a jar; else, it is argued, the cause would not precede the effect, which it is held it must do in order that it may be a cause,—as every substance is of its own qualities.

are divided from one another by the fact that the first is Substance, that the second is Quality, and so on; while the fact of being the Ether is what divides the Ether from the other members of the category of Substance].

सामान्यपरिहीनास्तु सर्वे जात्यादयो मताः ॥

XI. But all those whereof Genus is the first are held to be devoid of Genus.

सामान्येति । सामान्यानधिकरणत्वं सामान्यादीनामित्यर्थः ॥

a. "*Of Genus*" &c. The meaning is, that the fact of not being that in which Genus resides, is the common property of Genus and the rest [viz., Difference, Intimate Relation, and Non-existence].

END OF BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

THE CATEGORIES.

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